There's a pretty regular stream of news about activities in the office of California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, de-certifying or re-certifying voting systems following the results of the state's top-to-bottom review. Rather than making an up to the minute comment, I thought it would be useful to re-visit what I think is one of the more notable past scenes in the on-going drama.
Many thanks to what Dave Barry would call “alert reader Brandon F.” for posing a question that comes up a lot concerning digital voting. To paraphrase slightly: why not specify and standardize on ballot paper, ballot layout, ballot marking locations in the layout, and scanning systems to automate counting? Why is everyone making this so complex?
Back on 31.Oct the EAC's Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), released its recommended voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) for public comment during a 120 day period ending around 05.March.2008.
Here is a first-ever admission: a real software bug in a real voting system can drop real votes, and has
Nearly unbelievable, but perhaps predictable. The Brad Blog reports on a warning letter that Dr. Ed Felten, Professor of