A news article from Denver notes that the city is reversing its experiment from its last election, and going "back to paper."
It's Back to Paper Ballots, Precincts, For This Year's Elections
This only sort of true. Yes, it's true that Denver is using a voting method that election officials say they're more comfortable with, and that some voters will likely view as more trustworthy.
Yesterday, on July 4th, I took some time to reflect on nearly 400 years of elections in North America, in the hopes of having something meaningful to share in this blog, not about technology, but something fundamental. With little immediate success, I picked up a book, and re-read some email from a friend.
Attending and speaking at the Personal Democracy Forum last week, I came across a good phrase, "privatized elections," used to describe the widening role that private companies play in running U.S. government elections.
Good news from New Jersey! A judge there has reversed her earlier decision that test results on Sequoia voting machines could not be made public -- a story that we discussed a few months ago here. The new ruling means that conmputer experts at Princeton University will be able to analyze the machines starting next week, and publish their results in late September before the November election.
It seems like e-voting snafus are like weather: there’s always a bit of a storm somewhere, and now and then you get a big one. Although we can thank our lucky stars that we haven’t had a real hurricane, an electronic equivalent of Florida in 2000, the recent Arkansas vote-flipping snafu might qualify as a force 9 gale.
And because this time it is clear the outcome of the race was also flipped, this case of Arkansas State House District 45 in 2008 might
Voting in the Netherlands is now officially a process of hand-counted, hand-marked paper ballots. Why wouldn’t this work in the U.S. as well? A fair question...
Today's news of e-voting malfunction underscores my previous point about complexity of voting systems. This time, about 4000 ballots went uncounted in North Carolina's election this week.
Thanks to election technology expert Noel Runyan, I can explain another reason why the U.S. election systems market is under-served by today’s for-profit vendors of election technology. (And to read up on several other reasons, see Noel’s congressional testimony.)
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling onvoter ID high-lighted one of the many twisted issues in election policy. But combine that twistiness with the use of tech for e-voting, and you get some possibilities that are positively torqued -- and OBTW make another case for open source tech in elections. Here's how.
One of the most vexing frequent issues in e-voting debates is the idea of security vulnerabilities. I don't think that security is *the* problem with actual e-voting systems, but I do think that in-security concerns are a significant problem with the way many people think about how we do e-voting.
A news article from Denver notes that the city is reversing its experiment from its last election, and going "back
Yesterday, on July 4th, I took some time to reflect on nearly 400 years of elections in North America, in