It looks like there may some movement away from the current situation in which U.S. elections are increasingly outsourced and privatized.
Here is a first-ever admission: a real software bug in a real voting system can drop real votes, and has dropped votes. And perhaps has been doing so for years. I wrote earlier about the wrangle between the state of Ohio and Premier Election Systems (formerly Diebold), in which some real vote dropping was blamed on anti-virus software (which wasn't allowed to be in the machines in the first place!).
A recent New York Times editorial “The Right to Vote” explains how vote suppression is alive and well, with real barriers created to prevent people from voting, sometimes unintentionally, and sometime very much on partisan politics purpose. The most effective means are attacks on voter’s eligibility, by abusing voter registration information. (That’s one reason for OSDV’s efforts to create technology
There’s some intriguing and ironic details near the bottom of the on-going legal saga in Ohio.
A story from election integrity watchdog Mark L. provides yet another example the stark contrast between current election systems vendors current behavior and products, versus the kind of election transparency that’s needed to inspire trust in election results.
At issue the requirement that election systems product should track “undervotes” (the situation where a valid ballot contains no voter selection in a contest or measure) and report on the undervote rate.
Here is a follow-up to yesterday's note on how Georgia provided an example of how black box devices undermine confidence and foster suspicion.
First, there is a recent New York Times article A Tale of Three (Electronic Voting) Elections by Adam Cohen that provides some comparison of the Georgia incident with a couple others in which e-voting systems were apparently part of a suspect election result.
As a sad example of suspicion arising from current e-voting systems, I'd like you to read a story that I don't really know how to believe -- which is my point.
A news article from Denver notes that the city is reversing its experiment from its last election, and going "back to paper."
It's Back to Paper Ballots, Precincts, For This Year's Elections
This only sort of true. Yes, it's true that Denver is using a voting method that election officials say they're more comfortable with, and that some voters will likely view as more trustworthy.
Yesterday, on July 4th, I took some time to reflect on nearly 400 years of elections in North America, in the hopes of having something meaningful to share in this blog, not about technology, but something fundamental. With little immediate success, I picked up a book, and re-read some email from a friend.
Attending and speaking at the Personal Democracy Forum last week, I came across a good phrase, "privatized elections," used to describe the widening role that private companies play in running U.S. government elections.
It looks like there may some movement away from the current situation in which U.S. elections are increasingly outsourced and
Here is a first-ever admission: a real software bug in a real voting system can drop real votes, and has